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NOTE 
Recoupment and Bankruptcy: How to 
Effectuate Bankruptcy Policy Through the 
Same Transaction Test 
Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 981 (8
th
 Cir. 2012)  
JACOB THESSEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mixing the federal Bankruptcy Code with common law claims can    
certainly be a precarious endeavor.  The complexity of applying common law 
doctrines to bankruptcy cases is apparent when a defendant invokes the    
defense of recoupment to reduce his liability against a bankrupt plain-      
tiff’s claim.  
Recoupment has been described as a “powerful tool” in bankruptcy, ca-
pable of seriously influencing an individual’s income or an organization’s 
ability to reorganize.
1
  In essence, the common law equitable doctrine of re-
coupment allows a “creditor’s claim against a debtor to be reduced by reason 
of some claim the debtor has against the creditor.”
2
  It was first applied under 
the Bankruptcy Code in the 1980’s and has since become well established.
3
  
More recently, however, a number of courts have shown a “judicial distaste” 
for the doctrine and have refused to allow defendants to successfully utilize 
the recoupment defense against bankrupt plaintiffs.
4
  Some scholars would 
seek to abolish recoupment completely or, at the least, severely limit its scope 




 * Undergraduate degree in Political Science from Missouri State University; 
J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2014; Associate Member, 
Missouri Law Review, 2012-13.  I would like to thank Professor Michelle Cecil for 
her advice and guidance in helping me write this Note.   
 1. Marvin E. Sprouse III, Governmental Recoupment: An Equitable Remedy 
with an Equitable Result?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 26, 2007, at 12, 57. 
 2. Harold L. Kaplan & Timothy R. Casey, Recoupment in Health Care Bank-
ruptcies: A Shrinking Issue?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 26, 2007, at 16. 
 3. Shalom L. Kohn, Recoupment Re-Examined, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353,      
353 (1999).  
 4. Id.  
 5. Craig H. Averch & Blake L. Berryman, Getting Out of the Code: When Equi-
table Remedies Obtain Priority over General Unsecured Claims, 5 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 285, 300 (1996) (“The historical preference of recoupment claimants over 
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This Note will explore the interaction between recoupment and bank-
ruptcy by focusing on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re Terry.
6
  Terry is 
significant because the Eighth Circuit allowed an insurance company to re-
coup pre-petition overpayments from the bankrupt debtor’s post-petition ben-
efits.
7
  In doing so, the Eighth Circuit refused to acknowledge a separate bal-
ancing of the equities test, independent from the traditional same transaction 
requirement, when determining a creditor’s recoupment defense.
8
  
This discussion will center on recoupment’s “same transaction” test and 
why it can be utilized to achieve sound bankruptcy policy by denying re-
coupment claims.  It is this Note’s contention that Terry’s precedent, that the 
doctrine of recoupment does not include a separate equitable balancing test, 
will not be as devastating to bankrupt plaintiffs as initially thought by bank-
ruptcy practitioners and judges.  This is because the same transaction test is 
still a viable legal tool capable of denying recoupment.  
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
As an employee of the State of Missouri and member of the Missouri 
State Employees’ Retirement System (MOSERS), Joseph Terry received a 
group long-term disability policy through Standard Insurance Company 
(Standard).
9
  In the event of a disability, the Long Term Disability (LTD) 
policy provided eligible employees a monthly long-term benefit for the    
purpose of protecting the disabled employees’ earning abilities and bridging 





Code, and little or none in logic or policy.  Unless the holder of a recoupment right 
satisfies the requirements for an allowable setoff, or the debtor assumes the underly-
ing contract, the creditor is in the same legal position as all other general unsecured 
creditors.  The extra-statutory doctrine by which recoupment creditors get special 
treatment undermines the fundamental policy of treating similar creditors similarly, 
and the doctrine should be rejected.”); Kohn, supra note 3, at 353-54 (“[A]lthough 
there is an appropriate scope for the recoupment doctrine, it is far narrower than under 
the current state of the law.  More specifically, this Article will contend that although 
recoupment should be permitted when the creditor’s claim is sought to be recouped 
against prepetition amounts it owed the debtor, it should not be allowed to permit a 
prepetition creditor to be paid off by recouping against goods or services provided by 
the debtor postpetition.”).  
 6. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 7. Id. at 965.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 818 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 10. MOSERS, Long Term Disability Handbook: Coverage Available to Eligible 
Employees 4 (Mar. 2013), available at https://www.mosers.org/Members/Benefits/ 
Long-Term-Disability.aspx [hereinafter LTD Handbook].  
2
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Similar to most long term disability plans,
11
 Standard’s policy included 
a setoff provision that classified Social Security benefits as “deductible in-
come.”
12
  This means that Standard’s obligation to pay the disabled employee 
was reduced, dollar-for-dollar, by any amount the employee received from 
social security disability insurance.
13
  Under the LTD policy, it was the obli-
gation of the disabled employee to refund Standard for any overpayment of 
benefits that resulted from collecting social security income.
14
 
Terry became disabled and unable to work on December 6, 2005, as the 
result of severe bipolar disorder with psychotic features.
15
  He subsequently 
filed a long-term disability claim under the LTD policy.  After the insurance 
company approved the claim, Terry began receiving benefits from Standard 
in August of 2006.
16
  Pursuant to the deductible income provision of the LTD 
policy, Terry authorized Standard to automatically withdraw from his bank 
account any retroactive Social Security disability payments he received in 
order to satisfy the resulting “overpayment” of benefits obligation.
17
  In July 
2008, Terry received a $45,316.54 lump-sum award of Social Security disa-
bility benefits retroactively dated to June 1, 2006.
18
  Consistent with Terry’s 
prior authorization, Standard withdrew $45,316.54 from the Debtor’s bank 
account on July 24, 2008.
19
  One week later, Terry filed for bankruptcy.
20
 
On April 20, 2009, the bankruptcy trustee sent a demand letter to Stand-
ard.
21
  The trustee characterized the retroactive Social Security payment as a 
voidable preference under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code22 and instruct-
  
 11. Robert E. Hoskins, Long-Term Disability Offsets: What to Look for from a 
Claimant’s Perspective, S.C. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 24, 26. 
 12. LTD Handbook, supra note 10, at 6.  
 13. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), No. 08-43123, 2010 WL 2891710, at 
*1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. July 21, 2010) rev’d, 443 B.R. 816 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011), 
rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 14. LTD Handbook, supra note 10, at 8.  
 15. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 453 B.R. 760, 762 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 16. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 818 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 17. Terry, 2010 WL 2891710, at *1. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at *2. 
 22. Id.  A bankruptcy trustee is armed with the power to avoid (make the creditor 
return the transferred amount/goods to the debtor) pre-bankruptcy preferential trans-
fers made by the bankrupt debtor to a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 547.  Vern Coun-
tryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 
713 (1985).  In order for a trustee to avoid a preferential transfer, the transfer must be: 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such 
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ed Standard to return the $45,316.54 it withdrew from Terry’s account pre-
petition.
23
  Standard immediately complied, apparently with little or no re-
sistance, and sent the money to the trustee.
24
  After Standard transferred the 
$45,316.54 to the trustee, the insurance company began to deduct $430.20 
each month from Terry’s post-petition disability benefits in order to recover 
the amount of the retroactive Social Security benefits forfeited to the trus-
tee.
25
  Standard ceased these deductions and repaid Terry the benefit with-
holdings after the bankruptcy court voiced its concern that Standard may have 
violated the automatic stay.
26
  
On July 30, 2009, Terry commenced an action against Standard in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court of Western Missouri seeking, in relevant 
part, a declaratory judgment requiring Standard to pay, without any deduc-
tions based on Social Security payments, all of his future disability benefits as 
provided under the MOSERS LTD plan.
27
  Standard asserted the right of re-
coupment as a defense against Terry’s claim for post-petition insurance pay-
ments, arguing that Terry owed the company $45,316.54 for pre-petition 
overpayments under the insurance policy.
28
 
The bankruptcy court granted Terry’s declaratory judgment and found 
that Standard did not have the right to recoup $45,316.54 from Terry’s claim 
for future benefits.
29
  Because there was, in fact, a transfer of $45,316.54 
from the debtor to the creditor before the bankruptcy filing in this case, the 
court concluded that Terry’s overpayment obligation was already satisfied.
30
  
The dispositive issue, therefore, was whether Standard could assert a claim 
  
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made –  
 (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
 (B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the pe-
 tition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would re-
ceive if –  
 (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
 (B) the transfer had not been made; and 
 (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by 
 the provisions of this title.  
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).  But see § 547(c), (i) for exceptions.   
 23. Terry, 2010 WL 2891710, at *1. 
 24. Id. at *2.  
 25. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 962 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 26. Id.  The automatic stay is a mechanism of section 362(a)(1) of the Bankrupt-
cy Code that prevents a creditor from bringing an action against the debtor after the 
debtor has filed for bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). 
 27. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 819 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 28. Terry, 2010 WL 2891710, at *2. 
 29. Id. at *4. 
 30. Id. at *2.  
4
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through section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.
31
  According to the court’s 
interpretation, the statutory language of section 502(h) and the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s decision in U.S. Postal Service v. Dewey Freight System, Inc.
32
 did not 
permit recoupment.
33
  The court further justified its holding, denying Stand-
ard’s recoupment claim, as being consistent with the purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to facilitate equal distribution among creditors.
34
 
Standard appealed the adverse decision to the Eighth Circuit’s Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP),
35
 which found some major flaws in the legal 
analysis of the bankruptcy court’s opinion.
36
  The BAP stated that the bank-
ruptcy court erred in holding that section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code pre-
cluded Standard from recouping the overpayment from Terry.
37
 Additionally, 
the BAP concluded Dewey’s precedent was inapplicable to the present case.
38
   
  
 31. Id.  Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a creditor to recover a 
preferential transfer and satisfy its claim through the defense of recoupment.  Id. at 
*3.  11 U.S.C. § 502(h) states:  
A claim arising from the recovery of property under section 522, 550, 
or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection 
(a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this 
section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the 
petition. 
 32. 31 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1994).  See infra notes 130-143 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of this case.  
 33. Terry, 2010 WL 2891710, at *3.  Although Dewey involved section 
502(g)(1) instead of 502(h), the court explained that this distinction was not vital 
because the circumstances were analogous and that 502(g)(1) contained the same 
operative language as 502(h).  Id. 
 34. Id.  (“[I]t would be inimical to that purpose to interpret § 502(h) in such a 
way that would permit that creditor to once again obtain preference over other credi-
tors by use of the doctrine of recoupment.”). 
 35. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 818 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012).  Depending on the jurisdiction, a federal 
bankruptcy court’s ruling may be appealed to the district court, or, a bankruptcy ap-
pellate panel (BAP).  The Appeals Process, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppealsPro
cess.aspx (last visited June 15, 2013).  BAPs have been established by several courts 
of appeal to directly review cases from bankruptcy courts.  Id.  No matter which entity 
reviews the bankruptcy court’s decision (the district court or BAP), the losing party 
may, thereafter, appeal to the federal circuit court.  Id.  
 36. See Terry, 443 B.R. at 820.  
 37. Id. at 820.  According to the BAP, the Bankruptcy Code’s termination of 
Standard’s affirmative claim under section 502(h) had no effect on the common law 
defense of recoupment.  Id. (quoting Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 265 n.2 (1993)) 
(“[A] bankruptcy defendant can meet a plaintiff-debtor’s claim with a counterclaim 
arising out of the same transaction, at least to the extent that the defendant merely 
seeks recoupment.”). 
 38. Id. at 821.  The reason recoupment was not allowed in Dewey was because 
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Since both parties’ rights and obligations arose under the LTD plan    
and Terry did not adequately argue that the parties’ obligations were not  
sufficiently distinct, the BAP determined that Standard’s recoupment claim 
met the requirement that both debts arise from the same transaction.
39
        
The BAP went on to emphasize the equitable nature of recoupment and how 
the doctrine should be narrowly construed in bankruptcy.
40
  The case was 
remanded back to the bankruptcy court so it could properly balance the equi-
ties to determine if recoupment was appropriate.
41
  The BAP’s opinion con-
cluded by offering some relevant considerations the bankruptcy court should 
examine when balancing the equities.
42




On remand, the bankruptcy court employed a balancing approach and 
found that the equities weighed in favor of Terry for two reasons.
44
  The first 
was transactions based: allowing Standard’s recoupment claim would essen-
tially force Terry to repay his debt a second time, and, not to mention, Stand-
ard failed to put up any sort of fight when it immediately sent the money to 
the bankruptcy trustee.
45
  The second rationale centered on Terry’s medical 
prognosis, bleak employment prospects and minute income.
46
  In the end, the 
court felt that the hardship imposed on Terry by the recoupment claim was 




The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that Standard was entitled to in-
voke the common law equitable defense of recoupment because the obliga-
tions of both Terry and Standard arose under the same transaction, the LTD 
plan.
48
  Thus, Standard would be able to offset the $45,316.54 in “overpay-
ments” Terry owed it under the deductible income provision of the LTD plan 
  
commitments, a failure that is inextricably tied to its status as a chapter 11 debtor.”  
Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 
1994)).  It was clear to the BAP that Terry’s obligation was akin to a mere “overpay-
ment” and was not “inextricably tied to [his] status as a debtor in bankruptcy.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. See id.  The BAP surmised that it may be inequitable to allow recoupment 
because “Terry would be required to repay the funds a second time . . . [and] allowing 
recoupment might compromise the debtor’s fresh start” and “Standard did not defend 
itself against the trustee’s preference demand.”  Id. 
 44. See Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 453 B.R. 760, 763-64 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 45. Id. at 763. 
 46. Id. at 764. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012). 
6
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against Terry’s claim for future benefits.
49
  Of crucial importance, the Eighth 
Circuit made clear that an equitable balancing test was unnecessary because 
the singular requirement for recoupment, that both party’s claims arise from 
the same transaction, already incorporates elements of “[f]airness and equity” 
into the doctrinal analysis.
 50
   
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Doctrine of Recoupment and Its Application in Bankruptcy  
The common law defenses of recoupment and its more familiar col-
league, setoff, are ostensibly similar.  As put by the bankruptcy court in Ter-
ry, both doctrines are defenses employed by “a defendant to reduce or extin-
guish a plaintiff’s claim by reason of a claim the defendant has against the 
plaintiff.”
51
  However, significant distinctions between the two remedies do 
exist and are significant for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.  
First, the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay enjoins “the setoff of any 
debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title against any claim against the debtor.”
52
  In contrast, the auto-
matic stay provision does not expressly apply to recoupment, and, conse-




Second, unlike setoff, recoupment does not require mutuality of obliga-
tions.
54
  Recoupment allows a pre-petition obligation to be “recouped” from a 
post-petition claim.
55
  Setoff, on the other hand, requires that both obligations 
must arise at the same time, either pre-petition or post-petition, because sec-
tion 553 of the Code prohibits its use unless the right of the creditor stems 
from a “mutual debt.”
56
  A helpful illustration can be seen under the facts of 
the instant case.  Joseph Terry’s obligation to refund Standard the amount of 
the social security overpayment occurred pre-petition or before he filed for 
  
 49. See id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), No. 08-43123, 2010 WL 2891710, at 
*2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. July 21, 2010), rev’d, 443 B.R. 816 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011), 
rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 53. Averch & Berryman, supra note 5, at 293 (citing Holford v. Powers (In re 
Holford), 896 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1990); Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875-
876 (3d Cir. 1984); Rooster, Inc. v. Raphael Roy, SRL (In re Rooster, Inc.), 127 B.R. 
560, 570 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); Brock v. Career Consultants, Inc. (In re Career 
Consultants, Inc.), 84 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)).  
 54. Id. at 289.  
 55. Terry, 2010 WL 2891710, at *2. 
 56. 11 U.S.C § 553(a). 
7
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bankruptcy.
57
  Conversely, Terry’s claim against Standard sought a judgment 
to pay him post-petition benefits.
58
  Accordingly, Standard had to assert the 
defense of recoupment to recover against Terry’s suit for future, post-petition 
benefits because the mutuality requirement for setoff was not met.
59
  
Thus, because recoupment does not require mutuality of obligations   
and is not subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy, recoupment is stri-
kingly favored in bankruptcy over setoff.
60
  As the authors of one journal 




It is only fitting, then, that the highly preferred doctrine of recoupment 
should be burdened with an extra requirement.  For recoupment to apply, the 
parties’ obligations must arise from the same transaction.
62
  This third distinc-
tion, the same transaction test, does not apply to the doctrine of setoff.
63
  The 
right to a setoff can arise both when the parties’ obligations constitute a single 
transaction and when they are based on separate transactions.
64
  Thus, when a 
creditor’s claim fails to give rise to a setoff because the obligations of the 
parties are not mutual, the recoupment defense can still be successfully used 
only if the same transaction test is met.
65
  
As the singular requirement for recoupment (besides having a claim 
against the petitioner in the first instance), the same transaction test is usually 
determinative in recoupment cases.
66
  Although the same transaction test is 
crucial to the defendant’s recoupment defense, the legal bounds of the re-
quirement are not quite clear.
67
  Legal scholars explain, “[t]here is no general 
standard governing whether events are part of the same or different transac-
tions for purposes of applying recoupment.”
68
  Given the “equitable nature of 
the doctrine,” recoupment can be permitted only after a court has examined 
the facts and the equities of each case.
69
  Furthermore, judges across the 
country disagree on the correct application of the test: while some courts give 
the test a “liberal and flexible construction,”
70
 other jurisdictions use the 
  
 57. Terry, 2010 WL 2891710, at *1.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at *2.  
 60. Averch & Berryman, supra note 5, at 289, 293.  
 61. Id. at 293.   
 62. Terry, 2010 WL 2891710, at *2. 
 63. Averch & Berryman, supra note 5, at 289.  
 64. Id.   
 65. See id. at 288.  
 66. Id. at 293-94. 
 67. Sprouse III, supra note 1, at 12.  
 68. 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2746 (2013).  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
8
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phrase “same transaction” as a “term of art that must be narrowly defined for 
recoupment purposes in bankruptcy.”
71
  
The Eighth Circuit has adopted the position that “[t]o justify recoupment 
in bankruptcy, ‘both debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction so 
that it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transac-
tion without also meeting its obligations.’”
72
  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit has 
stated, “[a] fundamental tenet of bankruptcy law is that a petition for bank-
ruptcy operates as a ‘cleavage’ in time.  Once a petition is filed, debts that 
arose before the petition may not be satisfied through post-petition transac-
tions . . . Any recoupment exception to this general principle perhaps should 
be narrowly construed.”
73




The leading case on the application of the integrated transaction test is 
In re University Medical Center.
75
  In that case, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) withheld Medicare payments owed to University 
Medical Center (UMC) for post-petition services on the basis that it overpaid 
UMC for pre-petition services.
76
  After reasoning that a strict recoupment 
standard was “in accord with the principle that this doctrine, as a non-
statutory, equitable exception to the automatic stay, should be narrowly con-
strued,”
77
 the court denied HHS’s recoupment claim.
78
  Specifically, the 
Third Circuit held that the ongoing relationship between Medicare and UMC 
was insufficient for purposes of the same transaction test because UMC’s 
current and future reimbursements were “independently determinable” and 
“completely distinct” from the overpayments made by Medicare in the past.
79
  
In In re University Medical Center, the Third Circuit expressly rejected 
the alternative approach to the integrated transaction test, the more liberal and 
flexible “logical relationship test.”
80
  The court concluded, “[A] mere logical 
relationship is not enough: the fact that the same two parties are involved, and 
that a similar subject matter gave rise to both claims, . . . does not mean that 
  
 71. Id. 
 72. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 623 (8th         
Cir. 1994)). 
 73. U.S. Postal Serv., 31 F.3d at 623 (quoting In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155, 
158 (10th Cir. 1986)).  
 74. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.10 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, 
eds., 16th ed. 2013). 
 75. Id. (citing Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065 
(3d Cir. 1992)). 
 76. Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1070.  
 77. Id. at 1081.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.   
9
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the two arose from the same transaction.”
81
  Under this more lenient logical 
relationship standard, courts are more likely to allow recoupment because the 
parties’ obligations need only be “sufficiently interconnected.”
82
 
The doctrine of recoupment inherently conflicts with a major policy   
objective of the Bankruptcy Code that equally situated creditors be treat-     
ed equal.
83
  The Supreme Court reinforced this fairness notion when it held 
that “[e]quality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  According to that policy, creditors of equal priority should 
receive pro rata shares of the debtor’s property.”
84
  With recoupment, a credi-
tor can circumvent this equality of distribution purpose and receive preferen-
tial treatment by recovering the full amount of the debt (if recoupment is 
permitted) as opposed to receiving a pro rata share of the debtor’s liquidated 
assets like other general unsecured creditors.
85
  As discussed earlier, the fa-
voritism shown to recoupment in the bankruptcy process, most notably the 
opportunity to bypass the Code and recover more than other equally situated 
creditors, is buttressed by the requirement that the parties’ obligations arise 
from the same transaction.
86
  The Eighth Circuit explains, “To prevent a 
bankrupt’s creditors from using recoupment to gain unwarranted preferences, 
courts require that ‘the creditor . . . have a claim against the debtor that arises 
from the same transaction as the debtor’s claim against the creditor.’”
87
  
B. Narrowing the Same Transaction Test 
It can certainly be said that the same transaction test has “evolved into a 
fluid concept whereby a court that wants to permit recoupment finds it part of 
the same transaction, while a court that disfavors recoupment finds some 
means of holding that two transactions are involved.”
88
  Courts have engaged 
in what has been called the “stretching” and “narrowing” of the same transac-
tion principle in order to achieve what they feel is sound bankruptcy policy.
89
  
It is likely that those who preclude recoupment by narrowing the scope of the 
same transaction test do so for two reasons.  First, recoupment can frustrate a 
debtor’s fresh start,
90
 and, second, recoupment bypasses the Bankruptcy 
  
 81. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 744.  
 83. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, pt. II.C, at 19 (1977).  
 84. Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990).  
 85. Averch & Berryman, supra note 5, at 285.   
 86. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
 87. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 
1994) (quoting In re NWFX, Inc., 864 F.2d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
 88. Kohn, supra note 3, at 358. 
 89. Id.  
 90. See Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 821 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, (Feb. 15, 2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
10
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Code’s objective that one creditor should not be given preferential treatment 
over similarly situated creditors.
91
  
Multiple courts have fashioned a narrow version of the same transaction 
test in order to follow the design of the Bankruptcy Code and deny recoup-
ment.  A Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel went to great lengths in    
In re California Canners & Growers to rationalize its holding that the      
same transaction test was not met, even though the parties’ obligations arose 
from the same distribution agreement.
92
  The court reasoned that the two  
parties’ claims constituted a number of steps in “separate and distinct transac-
tions” and that “[t]he goods in California Canners’ post-petition invoice      
are not the same goods as in Military Distributors’ pre-petition invoices.”
93
  
In addition, the court pointed out that allowing defendant Military Distribu-
tors to recoup the payments would “permit anyone to offset post-petition 




In re Malinowski involved a debtor who moved for an order                
requiring the state labor department to turn over funds that the department 
withheld from debtor’s unemployment insurance benefits to recover over-
payments made to the debtor pre-petition.
95
  After rejecting a same-contract-
equals-same-transaction test and examining the context of the obligations at 
issue, the court also discussed equitable factors and stated, “[I]n light of the 
equitable nature of the recoupment remedy, the facts in the particular case are 
important.”
96




The Ninth Circuit refused to allow a creditor’s recoupment claim be-
cause the defendant-creditor effectuated a transfer in violation of the court’s 
order in In re Straightline Investments, Inc.
98
  The Straightline court nar-
rowed the same transaction test to the point of a nullity because it did not 
even analyze whether the parties’ obligations arose from a single occurrence.  
Instead, the court denied recoupment at the very outset “because it is an equi-
table remedy and equitable remedies may not be invoked to compensate 
someone who has engaged in inequitable conduct.”
99
    
  
 91. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.  
 92. See 62 B.R. 18, 19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).  
 93. Id. at 20.  
 94. Id.  
 95. 156 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 96. Id. at 135. 
 97. Id.  
 98. 525 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 99. Id.  
11
Thessen: Thessen
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Thessen – Final Formatting – 1/26/14 Created on:  2/17/2014 3:50:00 PM Last Printed: 2/17/2014 3:50:00 PM 
990 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
C.  A Separate Equitable Balancing Test  
There have been a small number of appellate court decisions touching 
on the use of recoupment in bankruptcy cases.  Accordingly, there is a dearth 
of precedent on the precise issue presented in Terry of whether a balancing of 
the equities test can be employed after the same transaction test is met.  The 




Slater involved a bankrupt but operational nursing home that failed      
to compensate third party providers after it received money from Medicare to 
pay for medical expenses.
101
  Slater instituted a proceeding against the     
government when Medicare sought to recover these misused payments by 
reducing Slater’s future Medicare reimbursements.
102
  Thus, the broad issue 
in Slater, whether a creditor could recover overpayments from a bankrupt 




The Slater court analyzed three narrow questions in order to determine 
the broader issue of whether a creditor could recover overpayments from a 
bankrupt debtor by reducing future post-petition obligations.  First, did the 
Medicare overpayments constitute a recoupment or a setoff?
104
  Second, if the 
Medicare payments did, in fact, constitute a recoupment, did the parties’ obli-
gations arise under the same transaction?
105
  Third, and most importantly, 
should an equitable balancing test be employed to determine whether the 
recoupment should be granted?
106
  
While the two lower courts agreed that the Medicare overpayments con-
stituted a recoupment and that the parties’ obligations arose from the same 
transaction, there was disagreement on the issue of applying an equities 
test.
107
  The bankruptcy court invoked equitable principles and rejected Medi-
care’s recoupment defense after performing a “careful weigh[ing]” of “the 
relative harm to both parties.”
108
  Foremost, the bankruptcy court reasoned 
that Medicare’s recoupment claim, if allowed, would significantly reduce the 
  
 100. 398 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 101. Id. at 99. 
 102. Id. at 100.  
 103. See id.  
 104. Id. at 103.  While a recoupment is allowed under the Bankruptcy Code, a set-
off would have violated the code’s automatic stay provision.  See supra notes 52-59 
and accompanying text.  
 105. In re Slater, 398 F.3d at 103.  
 106. See id. at 104.  
 107. Id. at 101-02.  Whether the overpayments constituted a recoupment and 
whether the same transaction test was met were at issue before the First Circuit be-
cause the precedent from In re Holyoke was not laid down until after both the Bank-
ruptcy and District Court’s came down with their decisions in Slater.  Id. at 102. 
 108. Id. at 101-02. 
12
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amount owed to Slater’s uncompensated third party providers, now creditors 
of Slater’s bankruptcy estate.
109
  In addition, Medicare would receive a wind-
fall if it were to recoup its payments because Slater provided all of the Medi-
care services and the third-party providers had earned the money.
110
  Thus, 
there was no actual “loss” to Medicare.
111
  
On appeal, the district court
112
 held that the “bankruptcy court had erred 
in ranging so broadly to balance the equities in order to nonetheless deny 
Medicare its right of recoupment and, at any rate, the equities cut in Medi-
care’s favor.”
113
  The district court found that the bankruptcy court’s equities 
test was fundamentally flawed in that it balanced the relative harms between 
Medicare and the third-party providers.
114
  The proper analysis was to balance 
the equities between the actual parties in the case, Slater and Medicare, to 
determine if recoupment should be granted.
115
  Under this analysis, the equi-
ties showed that it was in fact Slater who would gain a windfall if it were 
allowed to retain the payments.
116
  According to the district court, the money 
rightly belonged to Medicare and Slater was never entitled to the payments 




The First Circuit agreed with the lower courts and affirmatively an-
swered the first question, whether the Medicare payments constituted a    
recoupment, in accordance with its decision in In re Holyoke Nursing Home, 
Inc.
118
  Holyoke held that a government adjustment to recover a Medicare 
overpayment constitutes a recoupment, not a setoff, and was therefore     
permissible in bankruptcy.
119
  Likewise, the First Circuit agreed with the low-
er courts that the same transaction requirement was met and dismissed     
Slater’s argument that the payments owed to its third-party providers were 
wholly extrinsic to its relationship to Medicare.
120
  Instead, the court pointed 
out that under Medicare regulations,
121
 “overpayment” is defined to include   
a provider’s failure to liquidate costs in a timely manner.
122
  The recoupment 
  
 109. Id. at 102.  
 110. Id.   
 111. Id.  
 112. See supra note 35 for more information about the appeals process for bank-
ruptcy cases.  
 113. In re Slater, 398 F.3d at 102.   
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 103 (citing In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st  
Cir. 2004)).  
 119. In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 4. 
 120. In re Slater, 398 F.3d at 103.   
 121. 42 C.F.R. § 413.100(c) (2012).  
 122. In re Slater, 398 F.3d at 103.   
13
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analysis in Holyoke treated Medicare adjustments for over- and under-
payments as part of an ongoing stream to ensure that providers get only      
the money to which they are actually entitled.
123
  Flowing from this rationale, 
the court concluded that the same transaction test was met because Medi-




Because the First Circuit decided the first two questions against Slater, 
the case hinged on the equitable balancing test.
125
  Rather than affirming the 
district court’s analysis that the equities favored Medicare, the First Circuit, 
relying on Holyoke, categorically prohibited using an equitable balancing test 
after the same transaction analysis was completed.
126
  According to the court, 
“the same transaction analysis itself inherently embodies competing issues of 
equity, for the simple reason that ‘it would be inequitable for [a debtor] to 
enjoy the benefits of the same transaction without also meeting its obliga-
tions.’”
127
  Additionally, the First Circuit concluded that equitable principles 
should not interfere with the congressional policy that Medicare payments 
operate as a “continuous stream.”
128
  This congressional policy led the court 
to conclude that the overpayments met the same transaction test, and Medi-
care was entitled to recoup the third-party provider overpayments from Slater 
without regard to supplementary equitable factors of the case.
129
  
A case from the Eighth Circuit, U.S. Postal Service v. Dewey Freight 
Systems, Inc., also played a role in the Terry decision.
130
  The recoupment 
conflict in Dewey arose when the U.S. Postal Service sought to reduce dam-
ages incurred when the Chapter 11 debtor, Dewey Freight System, Inc., re-
fused to perform certain executory contracts.
131
  Dewey refused to perform 
because it argued that the Postal Service failed to pay for trucking services 
under those executory contracts.
132
 
While the Eighth Circuit agreed that the parties’ obligations arose under 
the same contract, it was not so confident that the claims arose under the 
same transaction.
133
  It was true, the court pointed out, that case law support-
  
 123. Id. at 104. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. (quoting In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992)) (first 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
 128. Id. at 104-05.  
 129. Id.  
 130. See Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 963-64 (8th Cir. 
2012); Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 821 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 131. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 621 (8th          
Cir. 1994). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 623. 
14
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ed the argument that the Postal Service could recoup claims arising from 
Dewey’s pre-petition trucking services against claims for post-petition ser-
vices under the same contracts.
134
  But the court held that the Postal Service’s 
recoupment claim against Dewey was inherently different because it stemmed 
from Dewey’s failure to perform its future contractual commitments.
135
  
This type of contract repudiation deserved to be treated as a distinction 
with a difference because Dewey’s failure to perform its future obligations 
was “inextricably tied to its status as a Chapter 11 debtor.”
136
  As such, the 
court needed to examine the treatment of executory contracts under the Bank-
ruptcy Code to determine if recoupment should be allowed.
137
  Under section 
365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor is authorized to assume or reject an 
executory contract with the approval of the court.
138
  The court recognized 
that section 365 reflects sound bankruptcy policy because the authority to 
reject an executory contract can “release the debtor’s estate from burdensome 
obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.”
139
  From the court’s 
perspective, it necessarily followed that the remedy for rejecting an executory 
contract
140
 “must be administered through bankruptcy and receive the priority 
provided general unsecured creditors.”
141
  
It was clear to the Eighth Circuit that the Postal Service’s claim of re-
coupment should be denied when viewed in light of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
treatment of executory contracts.
142
  In the end, the court was unwilling to 
allow the doctrine of recoupment to “frustrate” both the remedy for a debtor 
rejecting an executory contract and the overriding purpose of Chapter 11 to 
“prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs 
and possible misuse of economic resources.”
143
 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Eighth Circuit’s rather short opinion in Terry can be broken down 
into two parts.  In the first half of the decision, the court clarified its prece-
dent in Dewey
144
 concerning the application of recoupment for pre-petition 
  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006)).  
 139. Id. at 624 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,            
528 (1984)).  
 140. These remedies are contained in sections 365(g)(1) and 502(g) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.  
 141. Id. (quoting Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 531).  
 142. Id. at 625. 
 143. Id. (quoting Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528).  
 144. See supra notes 130-143 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.  
15
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obligations in post-petition bankruptcy claims.
145
  The remaining discussion 
focused on the approaches taken by other circuits as to whether they require 
an independent balancing of the equities test, in addition to the same transac-
tion test, in deciding recoupment cases.
146
  
Terry argued that an independent balancing of the equities test can deny 
recoupment.
147
 In particular, Terry relied on Dewey’s reference to recoup-
ment as an “equitable doctrine” and the Eighth Circuit’s acknowledgment that 
“[n]ot surprisingly, given the equitable nature of the doctrine, courts have 
refrained from precisely defining the same transaction standard, focusing 
instead on the facts and the equities of each case.”
148
  The Eighth Circuit 
completely rejected this reading of Dewey.  First and foremost, the court em-
phasized that Dewey never suggested an independent balancing of the equities 
test and did not set forth an additional element or precondition to recoupment 
that supplemented the same transaction test.
149
  Rather, the court’s use of 
equitable phraseology in Dewey was designed only to illustrate the injustice 
of applying the common law doctrine of recoupment when the same transac-
tion test was not met.
150
 
The second half of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion examined the relevant 
law of recoupment in other jurisdictions.
151
  Terry invoked three cases      
from other circuits
152
 in claiming that “the majority of Circuits to have ad-
dressed the issue of recoupment in bankruptcy have . . . applied it as directed 
by the equities of each case.”
153
  Again, the court rejected Terry’s interpreta-
tion of the law.
154
  While the cases cited by Terry did involve recoupment     
in the context of bankruptcy, all of them failed to address the particular issue 
  
 145. See Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 963-64 (8th     
Cir. 2012). 
 146. See id. at 964-65. 
 147. Id. at 963. 
 148. Id. at 964 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 
623 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. In re Straightline Invs., Inc., 525 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The doc-
trine of recoupment does not apply here, however, because it is an equitable remedy . 
. .”); In re Malinowski, 156 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying recoupment “in 
light of the equitable nature of the recoupment remedy”); In re Peterson Distrib., Inc., 
82 F.3d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The ‘same transaction’ requirement acts as          
a mechanism to ensure that equitable reasons for recoupment are present before a 
creditor may attain priority through the doctrine of recoupment . . . .  A ‘same contract 
equals same transaction’ rule would be overly simplistic.  Instead, as our case         
law illustrates, the ‘same transaction’ analysis involves an examination of the      
parties’ equities.”).  
 153. Terry, 687 F.3d at 964 (quoting Malinowski, 156 F.3d at 135) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 154. Id. 
16
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of this case: “whether a creditor who meets the same-transaction test can      
be denied recoupment based on a separate balancing-of-the-equities test.”
155
  
As in Dewey, each of these three decisions noted the equitable nature of re-
coupment.
156
  However, in two of the cases, In re Malinowski and In re Pe-
terson, the defendant’s recoupment claim failed because it did not meet the 
same transaction test.
157
  In the case of In re Straightline, the sitting court 
failed to apply the same transaction test and, instead, held that recoupment 




The Eighth Circuit agreed with the analysis in In re Slater Health Cen-
ter, Inc.
159
 and felt that the First Circuit’s opinion in that case unequivocally 
answered the legal question presented:  
[T]he same transaction analysis itself inherently embodies competing 
issues of equity, for the simple reason that it would be inequitable for 
[a debtor] to enjoy the benefits of the same transaction without also 
meeting its obligations.  In at least most cases, analysis of the recoup-
ment issue should both begin and end with the same transaction ques-
tion without discussing other equitable issues.  Since we have already 




Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that it was reversible error for the bankruptcy 
appellate panel to introduce a separate balancing of the equities test into the 
doctrine of recoupment and deny Standard a right of recoupment after deter-
mining that the obligations at issue arose out of the same transaction.
161
  
V.  COMMENT 
A. Reconciling Terry with Bankruptcy Policy 
Terry is significant for both legal analysis and policy reasons.  From a 
policy standpoint, the Eighth Circuit’s holding could be a major blow to con-
sumer debtors attempting to achieve a fresh start after bankruptcy.  But, as 
discussed below, judges still have a tool in their arsenal that allows them to 
  
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 623 
(8th Cir. 1994)). 
 157. Id.; see also Malinowski, 156 F.3d at 135; Peterson, 82 F.3d at 960.  
 158. Id.; see also In re Straightline Invs., Inc., 525 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 159. See supra notes 100-117 and accompanying text for a discussion on          
this case.  
 160. Terry, 687 F.3d at 964-65 (quoting In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d 98, 
104 (1st Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Id. at 965.   
17
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effectuate the policies of the Bankruptcy Code by considering the facts and 
equities of each case when applying the doctrine of recoupment.  Likewise, 
the legal reasoning in Terry, as well as the other cases discussed, is quite 
unique and interesting in that a common law doctrine, recoupment, was ap-
plied in tandem with the statute-driven Bankruptcy Code.  
Not surprisingly, comments in the aftermath of Terry called it a “credi-
tor friendly” decision,
162
 indicating that the Eighth Circuit’s holding would be 
a blow to bankrupt debtors.  However, Terry’s legacy and the Eighth Circuit’s 
holding may not be as damning to consumer debtors as predicted.  By the 
same token, it is doubtful that Terry is at complete odds with the underlying 
policies of the Bankruptcy Code.  Terry obviously prohibits the use of equita-
ble considerations when the court decides the parties’ obligations arose out 
the same transaction.
163
  Such precedent does not signal a death knell for 
bankrupt debtors, however.  Instead, Terry can confidently be viewed as a 
narrowly tailored decision because it only prohibits the application of a dis-
tinct equities test apart from the same transaction analysis.
164
  The solution is 
simple: if a bankruptcy judge wants to promote the policies of the Bankruptcy 
Code and deny the creditor’s recoupment claim by giving weight to the equi-
ties of the case, this action should be taken within the confines of the same 
transaction test.  
The specific mechanics of the same transaction test are not well defined 
in relevant case law, leaving courts with little guidance and broad discretion 
in determining whether obligations arise from the same transaction.
165
  The 
Eighth Circuit noted in Dewey, “[G]iven the equitable nature of the doctrine, 
courts have refrained from precisely defining the same-transaction standard, 
focusing instead on the facts and the equities of each case.”
166
  The Terry 
court went even further in stating, “Fairness and equity may influence wheth-
er two competing claims arise from the same transaction, but a court should 
not impose an additional ‘balancing of the equities’ requirement once a party 
meets the same transaction test.”
167
  These passages indicate that the courts in 
the Eighth Circuit can examine all relevant factors, especially the equities of 
the case, in deciding the same transaction question.
168
  Bankrupt debtors and 
  
 162. Michael L. Cook & Karen S. Park, Eighth Circuit Rejects “Balancing of the 
Equities” Test For Creditor’s Recoupment, SHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, Aug. 31, 2012, 
http://www.srz.com/Eighth_Circuit_Rejects_Balancing_of_the_Equities_Test_for_ 
Creditors_Recoupment/.   
 163. Terry, 687 F.3d at 964-65. 
 164. See id. at 965. 
 165. See Sprouse III, supra note 1, at 12.  
 166. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 623 (8th          
Cir. 1994). 
 167. Terry, 687 F.3d at 965. 
 168. Sprouse III, supra note 1, at 57 (“Courts often take the view that the right to 
recoupment, once established, is a matter beyond a debtor’s estate, and thus not to be 
impeded. Other courts, however, are willing to balance the consequences of the rem-
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recoupment-loathing bankruptcy judges in the Eighth Circuit should be re-
lieved because the court did not foreclose the possibility that recoupment 
could be denied by way of a narrow same transaction test.
 169
   
B. Same Transaction Analysis in Terry 
In light of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Terry,
170
 it is clear that Terry’s 
counsel should have vehemently argued that, based on equities and fairness, 
Standard’s recoupment claim did not arise out of the same transaction.  Thus 
the bankruptcy appellate panel and bankruptcy court could have successfully 
utilized the same transaction requirement to accomplish their equitable and 
policy goals. 
The argument that the same transaction test was not met with respect to 
Terry and Standard’s obligation is a rather simple one to make.  As discussed 
earlier, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the narrowly construed “integrated 
transaction” test for the same transaction requirement.
171
  Hence, because of 
the integrated transaction test’s very nature, an Eighth Circuit court would be 
much more sympathetic to the equitable factors that favor denying a credi-
tor’s recoupment claim.
172
  One scholar has gone so far as to say that the inte-
grated transaction test may be used to “deny recoupment in virtually every 
case.”
173
  While there is no proof that integrated transaction courts indiscrim-
inately deny all recoupment claims, this quotation suggests that these courts 
can latch onto a number of reasonable theories to deny recoupment.  
1. Same Contract Does Not Equal Same Transaction 
Here, it would be helpful to reiterate why the BAP concluded that Terry 
and Standard’s obligations arose under a single transaction.  Specifically,    
the BAP took a formalistic “same-contract-equals-same-transaction” ap-
proach when it held, “It is undisputed that both parties’ rights and obliga-
tions arise out of a single contract, and the debtor has not persuaded us       





edy against its equitable foundations.  In any event, case law provides ample authority 
for both sides in any dispute over the equitable application of recoupment.”) (empha-
sis added).  
 169. See supra Part III.B. for the application of a narrow same trans-              
action analysis.  
 170. See supra Part IV. 
 171. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.   
 173. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 74.  
 174. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 821 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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Without more, the BAP’s holding leaves itself vulnerable to attack.  As 
already mentioned, the Eighth Circuit applies the integrated transaction test to 
satisfy the same transaction requirement of recoupment.
175
  Accordingly, the 
court posited that “[f]airness and equity may influence whether two compet-
ing claims arise from the same transaction”
176
 and that recoupment should be 
“narrowly construed” as an exception to the general principle that bankruptcy 
serves as a “cleavage in time.”
177
  Additionally, other circuits have shared 
much of the same sentiments.
178
  
The BAP heavily weighted the fact that Terry and Standard’s obliga-
tions arose out of the same contract: the LTD plan.
179
  This is by no means 
dispositive on the issue.  While the Eighth Circuit is silent on whether an 
obligation arising under the same contract, by itself, satisfies the same trans-
action requirement, other courts have rejected such a formalistic approach 
and opined that a “‘same contract equals same transaction’ rule would be 
overly simplistic.  Instead, the ‘same transaction’ analysis involves an exami-
nation of the parties’ equities.”
180
  The Third Circuit in In re University Medi-
cal Center
181
 agreed with this view when it held, “Nor does the fact that a 
contract exists between the debtor and creditor automatically enable the credi-
tor to effect a recoupment.”
182
  Likewise, another court has reasoned that the 
existence of a contract between the debtor and the creditor does not guarantee 
the creditor’s recoupment claim.
183
  
2.  Equitable Considerations 
With these principles in mind, Terry’s counsel could have made a vigor-
ous argument that the same transaction requirement was not met.  Because 
the Eighth Circuit expressly stated that fairness and equity are factors that  
can be considered in the same transaction analysis,
184
 the BAP and bankrupt-
  
 175. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
 176. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 177. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178.  In re Peterson Distrib., Inc., 82 F.3d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The ‘same 
transaction’ requirement acts as a mechanism to ensure that equitable reasons for 
recoupment are present before a creditor may attain priority through the doctrine of 
recoupment”); In re Adamic, 291 B.R. 175, 182 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (“[T]he 
phrase ‘same transaction’ is a term of art that must be narrowly defined [for recoup-
ment purposes in bankruptcy].”). 
 179. Terry, 443 B.R. at 822.  
 180. Peterson, 82 F.3d at 960.  
 181. 973 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1992).  See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of this case.  
 182. Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1080.   
 183. See In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 78, 81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
 184. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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cy court’s rationale for denying Standard’s recoupment claim via a separate 
balancing of the equities test could just as easily be applied to the same  
transaction test.   
First, Terry voluntarily transferred $45,316.54 to Standard before he 
filed for bankruptcy to satisfy his social security overpayment obligation.
185
  
In this respect, depriving Terry of his post-petition insurance benefits would 
be “tantamount to making him repay his debt to Standard a second time.”
186
  
Standard’s conduct could also be characterized as “inequitable”; Standard  
did not fight the preference demand and sent the $45,316.54 to the trustee 
without resistance.
187
  In addition, after Standard sent the lump sum to the 
trustee, it unilaterally began to deduct a significant amount from Terry’s post-
petition disability benefits in order to recover the overpayment amount.
188
  
Standard was forced to cease these deductions when the bankruptcy court 
voiced its concern that the setoff might violate the automatic stay.
189
  Third, 
and most importantly, denying Standard’s recoupment claim would effectuate 
the equitable principles of bankruptcy to give the debtor a fresh start and not 
impose any hardships that may stifle this new beginning.
190
  Thus, consider-
ing fairness and equity, a strong case can be made that Terry and Standard’s 
obligations no longer arise out of the same transaction.  Moreover, when the 
issue is phrased in this way, denying Standard’s recoupment claim comports 
with the adage that recoupment should be allowed only where it would be 
“inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transaction without 
also meeting its obligations.”
191
 
Both the bankruptcy court and bankruptcy appellate panel were hostile 
to allowing Standard’s recoupment claim.
192
  Both denied Standard’s defense 
to Terry’s claim, albeit by way of two different theories.
193
  The bankruptcy 
court held that recoupment would be improper based on its reading of section 
502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code in light of Dewey’s precedent.
194
  The BAP, 
on the other hand, disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s rationale and struck 
down Standard’s recoupment claim based on a balancing of the equities 
  
 185. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 453 B.R. 760, 762 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 186. Id. at 763. 
 187. Id. at 762. 
 188. Terry, 687 F.3d at 962. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Terry, 453 B.R. at 764. 
 191. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 623 (8th          
Cir. 1994). 
 192. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.  
 193. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text. 
 194. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), No. 08-43123, 2010 WL 2891710, at 
*3 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. July 21, 2010), rev’d, 443 B.R. 816 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011), 
rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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test.
195
  Either way, it is quite evident that both courts were manipulating the 
recoupment doctrine to prohibit Standard’s claim and achieve an equitable 
outcome in favor of the disabled petitioner and against the deep-pocketed 
insurance company.  Unfortunately, these two collateral theories failed to 
prohibit Standard from recouping Terry’s disability insurance overpayments 
because they did not focus on the sole element of recoupment: the same 
transaction test.  The lower courts in Terry should have followed the lead of 
others and accentuated the equitable policies of the Bankruptcy Code by ap-




C. The Eighth Circuit Leaves the Door Open for the  
Same Transaction Test to Deny Recoupment 
Consequently, what effect does Slater have on the same transaction 
analysis formulated above? While the Eighth’s Circuit decision in Terry 
turned on the ruling in Slater,
197
 Slater has no real bearing on the same trans-
action test analysis discussed here.  The Eighth Circuit only cited Slater to 
support the proposition that an equitable balancing test should not be em-
ployed after it is determined that the same transaction test was met.
198
  In 
addition, the obligations of the parties in Slater were held to meet the same 
transaction test chiefly because of the court’s interpretation that Medicare 
overpayments met the same transaction test under statutory congressional 
policy.
199
  In Terry there is no such statutory code or congressional policy that 
presumptively decides that the obligations arise out of the same transac-
tion.
200
  Thus, in these types of cases, fairness and equity can be employed in 
the same transaction analysis to effectuate the bankruptcy court’s policies of 
giving the debtor a fresh start and blocking the creditor from obtaining pref-
erential treatment.  
This is not to suggest that a petitioner’s same transaction defense will be 
an automatic victory against a creditor’s recoupment claim.  Of course, a 
court is free to conclude that the equities align in favor of allowing the credi-
tor’s recoupment claim.
201
  However, this point does not obscure the sub-
  
 195. Terry v. Standard Insurance Co. (In re Terry), 443 B.R. 816, 821 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2011), rev’d, 687 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 196. See supra Part III.B. for the application of a narrow same trans-              
action analysis. 
 197. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 964-65 (8th     
Cir. 2012).  
 199. In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 200. See Terry, 687 F.3d at 964.  
 201. See supra note 112-117 and accompanying text (explaining why the district 
court in Slater held that the equities ran in favor of allowing the creditor to recoup, 
reversing the bankruptcy court’s finding that the equities prohibited recoupment). 
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stance of this Note: that the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Terry was not a com-
plete dispatch of equity and fairness in recoupment cases involving post-
petition debtors.  Instead, Terry can be read as leaving open the possibility of 
the same transaction test being used to preclude recoupment when the right 
set of equitable facts exist in favor of the debtor.   
Also of importance in this regard, the bankruptcy court and BAP in the 
Terry case were demonstrably looking for any cognizable legal theory to 
latch on to that would deny recoupment.
202
  The Eighth Circuit generally fol-
lows the narrowly construed integrated transaction test and, as a result, the 
same transaction requirement is still a viable option for courts to effectuate 
sound bankruptcy policy.
203
  Thus, Terry may be just as influential for leaving 
the door open for debtors who have valid fairness and equity considerations 
to escape recoupment while at the same time closing the door on debtors like 
Terry and preventing them from obtaining a completely fresh start.  
It would have been much more interesting if the lower courts in Terry 
had ruled that Standard was not entitled to a recoupment of the social security 
overpayments because the parties’ obligations did not meet the same transac-
tion test.  As exemplified by this Note, surely such a position is superior le-
gally and would have had a much better chance to survive the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s scrutiny as compared to a separate balancing of the equities test.  In any 
event, future bankrupt debtors should focus their arguments against recoup-
ment on the same transaction test.  In doing so, the debtor should focus on the 
facts and equities of the case that cut against the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of 
giving the debtor a fresh start and treating like creditors equally.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Note argued that the Terry decision on recoupment in the context 
of bankruptcy is limited and does not necessarily signal a major blow to 
bankrupt debtors.  Bankruptcy courts, especially those that follow the narrow-
ly construed “same integration” test, can still effectuate their policy of giving 
the debtor a fresh start post-bankruptcy and denying a creditor’s attempt to 
receive preferential treatment by prohibiting a defendant’s recoupment claim 
by way of the same transaction test.  The Terry decision, in essence, was lim-
ited to prohibiting an additional balancing of the equities that was applied 
after the same transaction analysis was complete.  
The Terry decision made clear that the outcome of recoupment claims  
in bankruptcy will center on the same transaction requirement.  So, how does 
the same transaction requirement limit the credit-friendliness of the Terry 
holding and give relief to debtors?  Nowhere did the Eighth Circuit expand 
the scope of the same transaction test or posit that recoupment must be     
allowed if the parties’ obligations arise out of the same contract.  On the  
  
 202. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.  
 203. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.  
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contrary, the court expressly stated that fairness and equity could be consid-
ered in analyzing the same transaction question.
204
  Thus, considerations of 
equity are inherent in the same transaction test.  Additionally, the same trans-
action analysis allows judges to alter the result of a specific case based on 
public policy.  This leaves bankruptcy courts the opportunity to look at all of 
the facts of the case and conclude which party the equities favor in a given 
situation.  In effect, debtors still have a chance to avoid recoupment claims, 
despite the Terry decision, if they can vigorously argue that on account of 
fairness and equity considerations the obligations at issue did not arise out of 
the same transaction. 
  
 204. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 687 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012).  
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